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PARENT-CHILD TORT IMMUNITY LAW IN OHIO
Few rules in our time are so well established that they may not be called
upon any day to justify their existence as means adapted to an end'
On a day in which it handed down forty-four2 opinions in a fashion remi-
niscent of the appointments of the "midnight judges" by President Adams, the
Ohio Supreme Court was called upon to justify its long-standing retention of
the parent-child tort immunity doctrine. In Kirchner v. Crystal,3 the court was
unable to vindicate the doctrine as a means adapted to an end and, thus, joined
the current trend" by abolishing parental immunity without reservation.'
Although Ohio's long overdue abrogation of the doctrine comports with con-
temporary notions of justice and fairness, the sudden manner in which the
reversal of positions occurred is devoid of logic, since only five months earlier
the court had reaffirmed its adherence to parent-child tort immunity.
In light of the abrupt change in Ohio concerning the parental immunity
doctrine, this comment will examine the historical justifications for the doc-
trine, with an extended discussion of the Ohio experience with the immunity
prior to its change in Kirchner. This comment also analyzes the present Ohio
position, contrasting it with the approaches of other states, and cautions
against the increasing use of family exclusion clauses7 in liability insurance
policies which have the practical effect of retaining the immunity where the
court has abrogated it.!
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Parent-child tort immunity is an invention of American courts. Without
citing any authority, either English or American, the court in Hewlett v.
'Justice Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of The Judicial Process 98 (1921) quoted in Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d
1013, 1016 (R.I. 1982).
'
T he forty-four opinions begin in the Ohio Official Reports series with Menifee v. Ohio Welding Prods., Inc.,
15 Ohio St. 3d 75, 472 N.E.2d 707 (1984) and end with Heckert v. Patrick, 15 Ohio St. 3d 402, 473 N.E.2d
1204 (1984). The court delivered the forty-four opinions on December 31, 1984, which was the last day of
the January 1984 term and also the last day on the bench for retiring Justice William Brown and defeated in-
cumbent Justice J.P. Celebrezze.
115 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984). The holding in Kirchner has been given retroactive application
by at least one district court of appeals. See Price v. Price, No. 3708 (Lorain County Ct. App. March 14,
1985).
4See Appendix at end of this Comment which lists ten states that have totally abrogated the parental im-
munity doctrine, twenty-five states that have partially abrogated the doctrine, and only fourteen states that
still retain the doctrine. One state has yet to consider the issue.
'15 Ohio St. 3d at 326, 474 N.E.2d at 275 (syllabus).
'See Mauk v. Mauk, 12 Ohio St. 3d 156, 466 N.E.2d 166 (1984). Mauk had reaffirmed Ohio's retention of
parental immunity by a four to three vote. Kirchner overruled Mauk by the same margin. Justice J.P.
Celebrezze, who had lost a November, 1984 reelection bid and who was serving his last day on the bench,
was the justice who flip-flopped.
'See infra note 134.
'See infra text accompanying note 134.
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George9 established the doctrine that an unemancipated child is barred from
bringing suit against a parent for injuries sustained as a result of the parent's
negligence. Denying the minor the right to sue her mother for wrongful in-
carceration in an insane asylum, the Hewlett court said that "[tihe peace of
society, and of the families composing society, and a sound public policy,
designed to subserve the repose of families and the best interests of society"
would be disturbed by such a suit and concluded that the child, through
criminal laws, had protection from parental violence and wrongdoing. 0
Despite the lack of authority, states almost universally adopted the
Hewlett rule." For example, the North Carolina Supreme Court declared that
"[i]f this restraining doctrine were not announced by any of the writers of the
common law, because no such case was ever brought before the courts of
England, it was unmistakably and indelibly carved upon the tablets of Mount
Sinai."' 2 Courts following the Hewlett rationale advance several reasons for
support of parental immunity.
The traditional reason in support of the doctrine is that family tranquility
or harmony will be disrupted by allowing the child to sue the parent. 3 A relat-
ed and legitimate concern is the threat to parental authority and discipline.'4
Further reasons for retaining parental immunity include the possibility of a
drain on the family funds or exchequer to the detriment of other family
members 5 and the possibility that the parent, through succession, would ob-
tain the funds the child might have recovered if the suit were allowed. 6
Other courts adhere to the doctrine citing the danger of fraud or collusion
particularly where liability insurance exists, 7 the analogy of the denial of a
cause of action between husband and wife, 8 and the general social policy
'68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
11id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.
"See Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity: A Doctrine In Search Of Justification, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 489(1982) [hereinafter cited as Hollister] where the author notes in a comprehensive citation that forty-two
states followed the Hewlett court's example. Id. at 494-95.
"Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 585-86, 118 S.E. 12, 16 (1923).




"See Agustin v. Ortiz, 187 F.2d 496 (1st Cir. 1951). As this argument has had little, if any, support by courts(even those that retain the doctrine), it will not be examined in this Comment. For example, in Dunlap v.
Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905 (1930), the court held the possibility of succession argument "too un-
substantial to be considered as more than mere makeweights ..... Id. at 361, 150 A. at 909. Furthermore,
not only is such a contingency remote, but it also applies equally to contract and property suits which are
allowed by the courts. See, Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Rule In Need Of Change, 27 U.
MIAMI L.REv. 191, 196 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Comment, A Rule In Need Of Change].
"See Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968) and cases listed at Annot. 6 A.L.R. 4th at 1078-81.
"See Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786, 787 (Iowa 1981).
[Vol. 18:4
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against interference with domestic government. 9 Each historical justification
for retention of parental immunity will be discussed in relation to the Ohio ex-
perience with the doctrine. 0
ANALYSIS OF OHIO DECISIONS
A. Ohio's Historical Background
No sooner had parental immunity gained universal acceptance, then
courts, including Ohio's, began to fashion a number of qualifications and ex-
ceptions to the doctrine." Such exceptions and qualifications were developed
on the theory that the suit involved more than just a simple negligence
action.22 However, as the California Supreme Court noted in its decision total-
ly abrogating the immunity, "such cases probably rested as much on growing
judicial distaste for a rule of law which in one sweep disqualified an entire class
of injured minors."23
Prior to the recent litigation in this state concerning parental immunity,
Ohio qualified its retention of the doctrine in two situations. The first situation
was in the 1952 case of Signs v. Signs,2" where a minor child sustained burns
when fire burst forth near a gasoline pump of his father's business. The Signs
court held that "a parent in his business or vocational capacity is not immune
from a personal tort action by his unemancipated minor child."2 Other
jurisdictions had recognized this qualification as early as 1932.26
While qualifying its retention of the immunity doctrine in simple
negligence cases in Signs, the court rejected some of the historical justifications
for the doctrine. The court rejected the family harmony argument stating that
tort actions by children against their parents would be rare in harmonious
families and that "where such actions were brought there would be a strong in-
dication that there was no harmony or domestic felicity in the family to be
191d.
"While the following analysis of the Ohio decisions may appear somewhat lengthy, especially in light of the
fact that Kirchner has made the cases obsolete, such analysis provides a vehicle for discussing the incon-
sistencies and inequities produced by adhering to parent-child tort immunity and allows for a sampling of the
rationale of the majority of jurisdictions which have wholly or partially rejected the doctrine. Furthermore,
the discussion of the Ohio cases prior to Kirchner should put into proper perspective the dilemma the Ohio
Supreme Court entrenched itself in by adhering to the immunity.
"See Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971) and cases listed at Annot. 6 A.L.R. 4th at
1093-1113.
"For example, the willful or malicious act exception followed in Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923
(1951), is obviously outside the scope of a simple negligence situation for which the doctrine is generally re-
tamined.
3Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 918, 479 P.2d 648, 650, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 290 (1971).
14156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E.2d 743 (1952).
"Id., 103 N.E.2d at 744 (syllabus).
'See Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
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disturbed."27 Accordingly, the court, in Signs, attacked the domestic harmony
argument by noting that denying the tort action would be illogical since the
court allowed suits between children and parents on contract or property ac-
tions where the threat of disruption is equally as great.28
The Signs court also rejected the fraud or collusion argument, particularly
where liability insurance was involved. While acknowledging that the danger
of fraud or collusion existed in a suit by an unemancipated child against the
parent, the court relied on two possible alternatives: 1) either the legislature
could abolish the minor's right to sue the parent where the danger was great or
2) insurance companies could place exclusions in their policies. 9
The second situation in which Ohio qualified its retention of the doctrine
occurred where the tort was willful or malicious. In Teramano v. Teramano, I
the minor child sued for injuries received when his father drove an automobile
into the driveway of the residence at a high rate of speed, failing to stop in time
to avoid hitting his child. 1 The court denied recovery to the child, holding that
the parent was immune from the suit, since the facts of the case failed to show
an abandonment of the parental relationship.32 However, the Teramano court
held that a malicious intent to injure evidences such abandonment, making a
parent liable in a tort action by an unemancipated child." Despite making a
second qualification to Ohio's now abrogated parental immunity doctrine, the
Teramano case neither rejected historical justifications for the doctrine nor
defined which justifications supported the past Ohio position.
B. Recent Ohio Cases
In Karam v. Allstate Insurance Co.,34 Ohio defined the scope of its
previous immunity doctrine. In Karam, the minor children were injured in an
automobile negligently driven by their mother who was killed in the accident."
In denying the minor children the right to sue the estate of the parent and the
respective insurance company, the Ohio Supreme Court simply reiterated the
holding of Teramano, adding that since the court recently reaffirmed
21156 Ohio St. at 576, 103 N.E.2d at 748.
1d.
"Id. at 577, 103 N.E.2d at 748. The issue of an exclusion clause placed in liability insurance policies is
discussed in greater detail later in the Comment. See infra text accompanying notes 134-49. See also Com-
ment, A Job Half-Done: Florida's Judicial Modification Of The Intrafamilial Tort Immunities, 10 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 639 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, A Job HalfDonel which provides an excellent discus-
sion of the debate over the presence of liability insurance.
m6 Ohio St. 2d 117, 216 N.E.2d 375 (1966).
31Id.
"Id. at 120, 216 N.E.2d at 377.
1d. at 117, 216 N.E.2d at 376 (Paragraph two of syllabus).
1'70 Ohio St. 2d 227, 436 N.E.2d 1014 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070. See Recent Cases, Karam v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 12 CAP. U.L. REV. 173 (1982).
"170 Ohio St. 2d at 227, 436. N.E.2d at 1015.
[Vol. 18:4
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adherence to the doctrine of interspousal immunity based upon the danger of
fraud or collusion, 6 it would be illogical to reject such reasoning with regard to
parental immunity."
The Karam court identified other reasons besides fraud or collusion in re-
taining the doctrine where the parent was deceased: preservation of family
tranquility, possible interference with parental discipline and control, and
potential depletion of family funds.38 Such reasoning, however, not only con-
travened Ohio precedent but was inconsistent with the rationale of the increas-
ing majority of states which had either repudiated the doctrine or had
abrogated it in part.39
The fraud or collusion argument relied on in Karam conflicted with the
court's rejection of that argument in Signs. I Further, as the dissent in Karam
noted, modern civil procedure and discovery tools, available to courts and in-
surance companies, could meet the challenge of spurious or fraudulent
claims."' Courts of other jurisdictions have also rejected the fraud or collusion
argument. Those courts allowed suits between spouses and between the adult
child and parent where the threat of collusion equals that between an uneman-
cipated child and a parent."2 The argument was also dismissed on the policy
ground that the interest of the child in receiving redress outweighed any possi-
ble threat of collusion. 3
The preservation of domestic tranquility argument cited in Karam con-
flicted both with Ohio precedent and with the rationale of numerous otherjurisdictions. In Signs, the court expressly rejected the family harmony argu-
ment." Karam 's failure to either overrule or distinguish the Sign's opinion re-jecting the family harmony argument gave little credence to its holding.
Other jurisdictions have rejected the domestic tranquility argument
stating that the negligent act of the parent, not the possibility of a lawsuit,
'4The Court had reaffirmed its adherence to the doctrine of interspousal immunity in Bonkowsky v.
Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St. 2d 152, 431 N.E.2d 998, cert denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982).
"70 Ohio St. 2d at 234, 436 N.E.2d at 1019.
mid. at 229, 436 N.E.2d at 1016.
"Tl7he rationale used in the Karam opinion had been rejected not only by the majority of jurisdictions notedin the Appendix to this Comment, but also by numerous commentators condemning the parental immunity
doctrine. See Hollister, Parent-Child Immunity, supra note 11; Comment, A Rule In Need Of Change, supra
note 16; Comment, Parent Child Tort Immunity: Timefor Maryland To Abrogate An Anachronism, I I U.
BALT. L. REV. 435 (1982); Comment, Parental Immunity: The Case For Abrogation 0/fParental Immunity
In Florida, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 794 (1973); Note, Intrafamilial Tort Immunity In New Jersey: Dismantling
The Barrier To Personal Injury Litigation, 10 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 661 (1971); and Note, Turner v. Turner:
Abrogation Of The Parental Immunity Doctrine, 27 S.D.L. REV. 171 (1982).
'See supra text accompanying note 29.
'70 Ohio St. 2d at 239, 436 N.E.2d at 1022 (C. Brown, J., dissenting).
"See e.g., Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 436, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966); Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d
669, 673 (Del. 1976) and Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 495, 267 A.2d 481, 488 (1970).
"See Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 380-81, 282 A.2d 351, 355 (1971).
"See supra text accompanying notes 27, 28.
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disrupts the domestic tranquility of a family.5 Such an argument was found
objectionable by the New Hampshire Supreme Court where it stated that "it is
difficult, if not impossible, to perceive how.., family peace can be jeopardized
more in an ordinary tort for negligene ... than by an action in contract or to
protect property rights or for an assault - all of which are permitted in this
state."' Therefore, there is no reasonable distinction which mandates a court
to protect property rights more than personal rights.
The potential depletion of family funds argument relied upon by the
Karam majority also lacked merit where liability insurance existed, such as in
the Karam case.'7 Both Massachusetts and Delaware have dispensed with this
argument since both parties seek recovery from the insurance carrier to create
a fund for the child's medical care and support, without depleting the family's
other assets. 8 Since most tort suits are not undertaken in absence of a deep
pocket, in cases where insurance does not exist, a minor child is not likely to
bring suit (especially where mutual love and respect exists).'9
The final argument relied upon in Karam was the legitimate concern for
possible interference with parental discipline and control. However, this argu-
ment was of doubtful validity under the facts of Karam where the suit was
against the deceased parent's estate." As the dissent in Karam correctly noted:
Since the tortfeasor parent ... is now deceased, such action can have no
effect whatever on the discharge of the surviving parent's responsibili-
ties .... Rather, a successful suit by the Karam children against the de-
ceased parent's administrator, the children thereafter obtaining the liabili-
ty insurance benefits to satisfy such claims, would ease the financial bur-
dens caused by the bodily injuries, thereby promoting family harmony.5
Such a suit cannot possibly interfere with the deceased parent's discipline or
control.
The parental discipline and control argument has been rejected by other
jurisdictions faced with factual situations almost identical to Karam. Some
jurisdictions hold that the doctrine expires upon the death of the person pro-
tected since the death terminates the family relationship. Accordingly, there is
'See e.g., Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 484, 488, 462 P.2d 1007, 1009 (1969) and
Smith V. Kaufman, 212 Va. 181, 185-86, 183 S.E.2d 190, 194 (1971) (quoting Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482,
489-90, 267 A.2d 481, 484-85 (1970)).
6 fBriere, 107 N.H. at 435-46, 224 A.2d at 591.
"70 Ohio St. 2d at 227, 436 N.E.2d at 1015.
"See Sorenson v. Sorenson, 369 Mass. 350, 362, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975) and Williams, 369 A.2d at 672.
See also Berman, Time To Abolish Parent-Child Tort Immunity: A Call To Repudiate Mississippi's Gift To
The American Family. 4 NOVA L.J. 25, 38 (1980).
"See Sorenson, 369 Mass. at 361, 339 N.E.2d at 913.
*70 Ohio St. 2d at 227, 436 N.E.2d at 1015.
"Id. at 236-38, 436 N.E.2d at 1021-22 (C. Brown, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 18:4
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no longer in existence a relationship within the reasonable contemplation of
the doctrine. 2 Other states dismiss the argument in automobile negligence ac-
tions on the theory that driving has no relationship to parental care and con-
trol and is outside the realm of immunity. 3
As the rationale in Karam was both inconsistent with Ohio precedent and
criticized by numerous other jurisdictions when faced with identical fact situa-
tions, the Karam opinion was of questioned validity. A short year and one-half
later, the Ohio Supreme Court expressly overruled Karam in Dorsey v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.54 The factual situation in Dorsey was
identical to that of Karam: a parent negligently operated an automobile injur-
ing her minor children in an accident in which the parent received fatal in-
juries.5"
The court overruled Karam and held that the doctrine of parental im-
munity does not bar an action in negligence brought against the estate of a
deceased parent and the respective insurance company by the unemancipated
minor children. 6 The court supported its ruling by noting that it had recently
faced a similar issue in the context of interspousal immunity, where the estate
of the deceased spouse brings an action against the surviving spouse, and held
that the action was not barred by the interspousal immunity doctrine.5"
The court's analogy to the partial abrogation of interspousal immunity
was weak since Ohio, in Signs, expressly rejected the validity of such an
analogy. 8 Furthermore, recognized writers59 and other jurisdictions have
criticized the drawing of such an analogy.w
However, since numerous other states hold that approval or disapproval
of interspousal immunity can support the acceptance or rejection of the paren-
tal immunity doctrine,6' the analogy drawn in Dorsey may be valid. Regardless
of the validity of the drawing of such an analogy, the Dorsey decision was sus-
tainable on other grounds.
The Dorsey majority rejected the traditional justifications that the Karam
court cited for its retention of parental immunity. The Dorsey court said that
such justifications are not present where the parent, who would normally be
2See Fugate v. Fugate, 582 S.W.2d 663, 667 n. 5 (Mo. 1979).
3See Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 14 (Alaska 1967) and Sorenson, 369 Mass. at 365-66, 339 N.E.2d at 916.
1490 Ohio St. 3d 27, 457 N.E.2d 1169 (1984).
551d. at 28, 457 N.E.2d 1169.
"Id. at 27, 457 N.E.2d 1169 (syllabus).
'ld. at 29, 457 N.E.2d at 1170-71 (citing Prem v. Cox, 2 Ohio St. 3d 149, 443 N.E.2d 511 (1983).
"See Signs, 156 Ohio St. at 570, 103 N.E.2d at 746.
59See W. Prosser, LAW OF TORTS §122 at 865-66 (4th ed. 1971).
1*See Worrel v. Worrel, 174 Va. 11, 19-20, 4 S.E.2d 343, 346 (1939). The dissent in Dorsey also criticized the
drawing of the analogy between the interspousal and parental immunity doctrines. Dorsey 9 Ohio St. 3d at
31, 457 N.E.2d at 1172 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"See. e.g.. Turner. 304 N.W.2d at 787.
Spring, 19851 COMMENT'S
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able to invoke the immunity, is deceased. 2 The court said that:
[Tihere is no longer the compelling need to preserve harmony and tran-
quility between a child and a deceased parent or to insure the ability of the
parent to discipline the child. Moreover, the risks of fraud and collusion
are considerably lessened where the parent.., is deceased and is no longer
capable of fabricating evidence or structuring a lawsuit so as to allow
recovery by the child against the parent's insurer.63
Dorsey's limited exception to the immunity doctrine was justified since the pa-
rental immunity doctrine should be confined to cases supported by the tradi-
tional justifications."4 Clearly, such justifications are not present where the suit
is brought against the estate of a deceased parent and the respective insurance
company.
The limited exception fashioned by the Dorsey court seemingly signaled a
relaxation of Ohio's strict adherence to parental immunity. Six months after
Dorsey, the court in Mauk v. Mauk6 3 addressed the issue of parent-child immu-
nity in a simple negligence case where both the unemancipated minor and par-
ent were alive. Any relaxation of Ohio's position signaled by Dorsey was laid
to rest in Mauk, as the court reaffirmed its longstanding adherence to the doc-
trine.66
Mauk arose under a factual situation different from the previous Ohio
cases concerning parental immunity. In Mauk, the parents brought a tort ac-
tion against their unemancipated minor son who negligently allowed a ladder
to fall off his truck into the path of his parents, who were following the son,
causing the parents to lose control of their car resulting in a collision.6 1
Although the parents had brought suit, the Mauk court recognized the cor-
ollary rule to parental immunity - that a parent may not prosecute a tort ac-
tion against the unemancipated minor child. 68
629 Ohio St. 3d at 29, 457 N.E.2d at 1171.
631d.
"An additional argument was suggested by the appellant in Dorsey. Appellant contended that the Karamdecision did not represent the view of the duly elected and currently serving members of the court. 9 Ohio St.
2d at 30 n. 2, 457 N.E.2d at 1171 n. 2. Appellant's suggestion was in reference partly to the intervening elec-
tion in which Democrat James P. Celebrezze (the Chief Justice's brother) won election and replaced
Republican Blanche Krupansky (appellant was also likely referring to the fact that two of the justices in the
Dorsey majority were temporarily not sitting when Karam was decided). The Dorsey majority rejected such
a suggestion, stating that Karam is unjust, irrespective of the source of that determination. Id.
The importance of such a substantial change in the court personnel from the Karam to Dorsey decisions
cannot be ignored. Attention is given to this argument especially in light of the November, 1984 election in
which Justices Craig and Wright won election and will be replacing retiring Justice William Brown and un-
successful incumbent James P. Celebrezze. This argument is discussed more fully later in this Comment. See
supra text preceding note Il1.
'12 Ohio St. 3d 156, 466 N.E.2d 166 (1984).
"Id.
67Id.
"Id. at 157, 466 N.E.2d at 167.
[Vol. 18:4
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In a per curiam opinion in which four justices concurred, 9 the Mauk
court stated that two of the historical justifications in support of parental im-
munity had special application to the adoption of the reciprocal immunity of
the unemancipated minor child."° The court cited the fraud or collusion7' and
domestic tranquility" arguments, adding that it would be inconsistent for the
parent "to occupy the role of parent and guardian to a child, thereby being en-
trusted with the child's care, and to simultaneously pursue an action for
damages against the child.""
The opinion in Mauk surveyed the case law concerning both the parent's
immunity and the child's immunity. Although the court's own research re-
vealed that only fifteen other jurisdictions adhered to the parental immunity
doctrine for simple negligence torts74 (while the remaining jurisdictions either
have never initially adopted the doctrine or have abrogated it in part)," the
Mauk court sustained the immunity doctrine. The court, in Mauk, was in-
clined to agree with the weight of authority which considered the issue of the
child's liability and had come down in favor of immunity."
The per curiam opinion was severely criticized by the three dissenters in
Mauk. Justice Clifford Brown said that by overruling the parental immunity
doctrine, the court would not have had to create a child-immunity rule.77 He
rejected the policy argument of Justice Locher, who concurred in the Mauk
result, by saying that "[nlo amount of glorification of the family unit and be-
"Chief Justice Celebrezze and Justices Locher, Holmes and J.P. Celebrezze formed the majority. Id. at 159,
466 N.E.2d at 169.
712 Ohio St. 3d at 159, 466 N.E.2d at 168.
"The court said that where the parent in this case was the owner of both vehicles involved in the collision,
and presumably the insurer of both, it was "indeed doubtful as to whether the interests of the parties [were]
truly adverse in nature. In the event they are not, the potential for fraud and collusion is unusually great."
Id., 466 N.E.2d at 169.
The court's concern here is unfounded. In citing the fraud or collusion argument, the court neither ad-
dressed the fact that insurance companies and/or the judicial system can ferret out false claims nor did it re-
spond to other arguments which defeat the fraud or collusion contention. See supra text accompanying
notes 40-43.
"In discussing the domestic tranquility argument, the court said that if "the relationship of the parties is in
fact adverse as a consequence of this lawsuit, violence is done to the peace and harmony of the family unit."
12 Ohio St. 3d at 159, 466 N.E.2d at 169. However, the court neither addressed the argument that it is the
negligent act, and not the lawsuit, that disrupts the harmony nor did it respond to other arguments defeating
the domestic tranquility contention. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46.
'"12 Ohio St. 2d at 159, 466 N.E.2d at 169.
"The court lists the state of Illinois in its citation of fifteen jurisdictions which adhere to the doctrine despite
the recent reversal of that position by numerous Illinois appellate courts. See, e.g., Hogan v. Hogan, 106 I11.
App. 3d 104, 435 N.E.2d 770 (1982) and other cases listed in the Appendix to this Comment which
categorizes Illinois as a jurisdiction which has partially abrogated the immunity doctrine.
"The court's citation of the group of states never initially adopting the doctrine or which have at least
abrogated it in part does not include the states of South Dakota or Texas. See Appendix to this Comment.
"12 Ohio St. 3d at 159, 466 N.E.2d at 168.
"Id. at 160, 466 N.E.2d at 169 (C. Brown, J., dissenting). The "child immunity corollary" to the parental im-
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moaning that elimination of parental immunity 'would deal another blow to
those fighting the glorious battle to support the family,' and the false founda-
tion upon which it rests, can justify this court's continued acceptance of this
useless doctrine."'78
Justice Brown also rejected the per curiam opinion on several substantive
grounds. He noted that the fraud or collusion argument was unanimously re-
jected by the court when it declared Ohio's Guest Statute unconstitutional. 9
Citing the many safeguards against fraudulent or collusive claims,10 he added
that the decision in Mauk exhibited no faith in the judicial system, "implicitly
assert[ing] that the system is paralyzed when it comes to discerning false
negligence actions between a parent and a child.""
Noting that the per curiam factual statements concerning the states' posi-
tions as to the immunity doctrine gave a false impression of the support for it,
Justice Brown correctly disagreed with the per curiam statements since the
current trend rejected the doctrine. 2 Furthermore, he raised the argument that
the doctrine was unconstitutional under both the Ohio Constitution's and
United States Constitution's due process of law and equal protection clauses. 3
He argued that allowing a child to sue a parent, and vice versa, in many other
civil actions" pointed to the discriminatory nature of the bar to a suit in
negligence actions provided by the immunity doctrine. 5
While Mauk represented the Ohio Supreme Court's clearest justification
of its previous adherence to the doctrine in simple negligence situations, a case
decided one week after Mauk "sub silentio places a foot in the door to abrogate
the doctrine of parent-child immunity which was recently upheld .... "" While
inconsistent with Mauk, the court's result in Sumwalt v. Allstate Insurance
Co." suggested at the very least that the status of parental immunity in Ohio
was far from settled.8
"12 Ohio St. 3d at 160, 466 N.E.2d at 170 (C. Brown, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 161, 466 N.E.2d at 170 (C. Brown, J., dissenting). The court declared Ohio's Guest Statute un-
constitutional in Primes v. Taylor, 43 Ohio St. 2d 195, 331 N.E.2d 723 (1975).
wIhe safeguards noted by Justice C. Brown include the extensive and pretrial discovery procedures of Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure 26 through 37 and the procedures of Civil Rule 56 relating to summary judgment.
Mauk, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 161, 466 N.E. 2d at 170 (C. Brown, J., dissenting).
81d.
111d.
"Id. at 162, 466 N.E.2d at 171 (C. Brown, J., dissenting).
"The other civil actions in which a child may sue his parent, and vice versa, in Ohio include the right to sue
to set aside a real estate conveyance, and the right to sue for compensation for services. See 41 OHIO JUR. 2d
Parent and Child §§ 60, 62 (1960).
u12 Ohio St. 2d at 162, 466 N.E.2d at 171 (C. Brown, J., dissenting).
"Sumwalt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 12 Ohio St. 3d 294, 297, 466 N.E.2d 544, 547 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
"12 Ohio St. 3d 294, 466 N.E.2d 544 (1984).
UIn Sumwalt, Justice J.P. Celebrezze, who voted with the majority in Mauk in retaining the immunity, joined
with Justice Sweeney in Justice Clifford Brown's plurality opinion. Justice William Brown concurred in thejudgment only, while Chief Justice Celebrezze concurred in the syllabus and judgment only.
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In Sumwalt, the minor child injured his parent who was standing in front
of her car when the child started the car engine with the transmission in gear.89
The parent filed an action against the Allstate Insurance Company to deter-
mine if she had a right to uninsured motorists benefits under Allstate's auto-
mobile insurance policy in effect on the date of the accident." The court of ap-
peals in this case reasoned that the basic principle of parent-child immunity
was dispositive and dismissed the parent's complaint, entering judgment for
Allstate.9
In reversing the court of appeals decision, the Ohio Supreme Court re-
jected the court of appeals' rationale that [Mauk's] retention of the immunity
doctrine was applicable.92 The supreme court, after interpreting an uninsured
motorists provision" in the parent's liability policy, held that:
The phrase "legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an
uninsured auto," . . . means that the insured must be able to prove the
elements of her claim necessary to recover damages. That the uninsured
motorist tortfeasor has a child-parent immunity does not affect the in-
sured's elements of the claim for damages nor the insured's right to
recover uninsured motorists benefits from her insurer.'
This holding clearly abrogates parent-child tort immunity where a "legally en-
titled to recover" provision exists in an automobile liablity insurance policy.
However, the Sumwalt majority noted that since only three justices favored
total abrogation of the doctrine, the immunity's posture and efficacy discussed
in Karam is as stated in the majority opinion in Dorsey."
Justice Holmes correctly noted in dissent that Sumwalt is inconsistent
with the court's holding in Mauk and listed other jurisdictions which con-
cuffed, in his view, that due to parent-child immunity a mother could not
recover from her insurer since she was not legally entitled to recover damages
from her child." Although Holmes correctly identified the flaw in the
majority's opinion, his opinion fails to recognize the inequities that would be
created by adhering to the immunity doctrine under factual situations similar
"12 Ohio St. 3d at 294, 466 N.E.2d at 545.
"Id.
11d. at 295, 466 N.E.2d at 545.
21d.
3The uninsured motorists provision in the parent's liability policy states, in pertinent part:
We will pay for bodily injury, sickness, disease or death which a person insured is legally entitled to
recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto. Injury must be caused by accident and arise
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured auto. (emphasis added by the court). Id. at
294-95, 466 N.E.2d at 545.
911d. at 295, 466 N.E.2d at 545-46.
"Id. at 296, 466 N.E.2d at 546.
*Id. at 297,466 N.E.2d at 547 (Holmes, J., dissenting). One of the cases Holmes cited is Patrons Mutual Ins.
Assn. v. Norwood, 231 Kan. 709, 647 P.2d 1335 (1982).
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to Sum walt. 97
While the court in Sumwalt reached the equitable result, possibly for
wrong or inconsistent reasons, it signaled that the court had not settled the
controversy over its purported retention of parental immunity. A short five
months after the Mauk and Sumwalt cases, the court did an abrupt reversal,
abrogating the doctrine without reservation in Kirchner v. Crystal.98
C. Ohio's Rejection of Parental Immunity - Kirchner v. Crystal
Without any explanation whatsoever, Justice J.P. Celebrezze made a sud-
den reversal of his views on parental immunity and joined the majority opinion
in Kirchner in abrogating the doctrine." In Kirchner, a parent had negligently
driven an automobile, injuring his stepson, a passenger in the vehicle. The
lower courts granted summary judgment for the defendant stepfather based
upon Ohio's then existing parental immunity.'00
Although the (minor stepson) appellant had urged the court to carve out
an exception to the court's parental immunity doctrine with respect to step-
parents or persons who stand in locoparentis, the Ohio Supreme Court resisted
such an argument since to create another exception would "only serve to
perpetuate the fallacious arguments which have supposedly supported the doc-
trine." 1 In an opinion which rejected the four basic justifications for the doc-
trine, Justice Sweeney wrote that the best approach for the Kirchner court to
follow was "to abrogate parental immunity in toto. "o'
The court, in Kirchner, rejected the domestic tranquility argument based
upon the criticism of such rationale in the Signs case'03 and stated that the tor-
tious conduct, rather than allowance of the suit, was more likely to disrupt the
family harmony.'0 Similarly, the court refuted the parental discipline and con-
trol argument since in many actions, no question of parental control will arise
- "the possibility that some cases may involve the exercise of parental
7For example, had a neighbor's child caused the negligent act in this case, Holmes's rationale would not ap-
ply, since there would be no immunity to contend with under such a situation. Thus, if a neighbor's child
caused the negligent act, the mother could recover; but, under Holmes' rationale, she could not recover if the
act were caused by her own child. Such a result is inequitable.
"15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984). The one-paragraph syllabus expressly overruled the Teramano
and Mauk cases. Id.
"In fairness to Justice J.P. Celebrezze, he did indicate, by joining the plurality opinion in the Sumwalt case,
that he had changed his views as to the doctrine prior to the Kirchner decision. See, supra note 8; of course,
this is even more perplexing as Sumwalt was decided only a week after Justice J.P. Celebrezze concurred in
Mauk in affirming parental immunity. See also, supra notes 2 and 6.
"MI5 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474 N.E.2d at 276.
1111d. at 330, 474 N.E.2d at 278.
"'Id. The court noted that in doing so, it joined the minority of jurisdictions that have totally abrogated the
doctrine. See Appendix, Section I.B.
"'1See supra text accompanying notes 27 and 29.
1"15 Ohio St. 3d at 328, 474 N.E.2d at 277.
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authority does not justify continuation of a blanket rule of immunity."'' 5
Citing the widespread availability of liability insurance, the Kirchner
court dismissed the potential depletion of family funds or exchequer
argument./° Likewise, the court debunked the fraud or collusion argument on
familiar grounds: "The deterrent effect of a perjury charge, extensive and
detailed pretrial discovery procedures, the opportunity for cross examination,
and the availability of summary judgment motions are but a few examples of
the tools available.., in exposing fraudulent claims.. . ."10 By individually re-
jecting the basic justifications for the doctrine, the court, in Kirchner, joined
the "long-overdue landslide"'18 that has eliminated, in whole or in part, a pro-
cedural bar to recovery in negligence actions.
While the Ohio Supreme Court has joined the modern trend of legal
thought by abolishing the doctrine, the Kirchner case rests on uneasy grounds
due to the abrupt manner in which the opinion was rendered. In dissent, Chief
Justice Celebrezze correctly noted that a majority of the court, as it existed at
the time of Kirchner, held in Dorsey and Mauk that parental immunity was
based on valid public policy objectives."° The Chief Justice was also at a loss
for an explanation regarding the court's sudden reversal, stating that he was
not convinced that his positions in Dorsey or Mauk were incorrect, nor did he
perceive "the type of societal revolution that would convince [him] that the
policy objectives ... have become obsolete."" l0
Justice J.P. Celebrezze's failure to support his seemingly inexplicable
change from Mauk to Kirchner has opened, to speculation, the validity of the
court's abrogation of parental immunity, especially in light of the election of
two new justices to the court. Those newly elected justices have replaced
Justices William Brown and J.P. Celebrezze, who constituted half of the ma-
jority opinion in the four-three Kirchner decision. Furthermore, the court
delivered the Kirchner opinion along with forty-three other opinions on the
last day of the term for Justices William Brown and J.P. Celebrezze. The man-
ner in which Kirchner was rendered opens the Ohio Supreme Court to the
criticism that the decision was no more than political maneuvering. "'
"'Id. (quoting Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 920-21, 479 P.2d 648, 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 292 (1971)).
"015 Ohio St. 3d at 329, 474 N.E.2d at 277-78. The court again relied upon the Gibson rationale, supra note
105, in rejecting the family exchequer argument. Such rationale is similar to that discussed at supra, text ac-
companying notes 47-49.
"715 Ohio St. 3d at 329, 474 N.E.2d at 278.
'*Prosser, Law of Torts §122 at 867 (4th Ed., 1971).
"'15 Ohio St. 3d at 331, 474 N.E.2d at 280 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting). Justice Holmes concurred in the
Chief Justice's dissent. Justice Locher submitted a separate dissent.
11015 Ohio St. 3d at 332, 474 N.E.2d at 280 (Celebrezze, C.J., dissenting).
"'The newly elected justices are Republicans Craig R. Wright and Andrew Douglas. Justices J.P. Celebrezze
and William Brown are Democrats.
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Despite the weaknesses of the Kirchner decision due to Justice J.P.
Celebrezze's inexplicable change in views, the result comports with the ra-
tionale of a vast majority of states which have either wholly or partially
abrogated parental immunity."' Ohio's in toto rejection of the immunity doc-
trine is in accord with only six other states."' Most jurisdictions, unlike Ohio,
have opted to retain the immunity in limited areas or have replaced the doc-
trine with a standard similar to that of the reasonably prudent person.
APPROACHES OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Wisconsin was the first court to express general dissatisfaction with the
parent-child tort immunity doctrine. In Goller v. White, "4 the court abrogated
the immunity except in two situations: "(1) where the alleged negligent act in-
volves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2) where the al-
leged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with
respect to the provision of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services,
and other care."" 5 Despite being criticized for its two-fold exceptions which
allowed the parent "carte blanche to act negligently toward his child ... with
impunity,"" 6 the Goller exceptions recognized the legitimate concern over in-
fringing upon the parents' discretion in performing their parental obligations.
The more liberal California approach, developed in Gibson v. Gibson"',
totally abrogated the doctrine and replaced it with the following test: "what
would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent have done in similar cir-
cumstances?""' This test has been adopted by one other jurisdiction, which
once recognized the Goller exceptions."'
The Gibson test has been supported since it avoids the inconsistent results
reached under a Goier approach' ° and because it is more flexible, allowing the
court to impose or reject the immunity as the situation demands.' However,
the reasonably prudent parent standard has drawn severe criticism by courts'
and writers' since the test "requires that parents conform to a community
standard that may be directly at odds with the parents' belief as to how to raise
'See Appendix to this Comment which lists thirty-five states that have wholly or partially repudiated the
immunity.
'See, e.g., Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971).
"20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).
"1d. at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.
"'Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
'"3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
1111d. at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. See Comment, The "Reasonable Parent"Standard: An
Alternative to Parent-Child Tort Immunity, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 795 (1976).
"'See generally, Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
120d.
"'See Comment, A Rule in Need of Change, supra note 16.
"'See Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y. 2d 35, 324 N.E.2d 338, 364 N.Y.S. 2d 859 (1974).
"'See Comment, A Job Half-Done, supra note 29.
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their children.' '1 24
A third approach, which has drawn acceptance by the Illinois appellate
courts, would abrogate the immunity where the negligent act occurred outside
the scope of the parental relationship." That view has been couched in dif-
ferent terms. In Cummings v. Jackson,'2 6 the court abrogated the immunity
where the negligent act is a breach of a duty "owed primarily to the general
public, however, and only incidentally to the members of the family,"'12 thus,
taking the act outside the scope of the family relationship.
As the Illinois approach is relatively new, it has not yet gained either ac-
ceptance or rejection at any level. However, the approach is laudable as it
seeks to compensate the child in situations where, previously, recovery was
denied to the child yet allowed to a member of the general public. The obvious
criticism of this view is that it denies redress to the injured minor in situations
where the negligent act can be classified as within the parental relationship.
A final approach2 ' is derived from a recent Florida Supreme Court deci-
sion. In Ard v. Ard, "I the court abrogated the immunity in negligence suits to
the extent of the parents' existing liability insurance coverage. 30 The court
stressed that "Itihe presence of this type of insurance cannot create a liability
where none previously existed, but, rather, forms the basis for the recognition
of the change in conditions upon which the public policy behind the immunity
is based."''
The Florida approach, despite its problems with the family exclusion
clause exception,12 recognizes that insurance defeats the traditional justifica-
tions for the doctrine. Since most parent-child suits occur in the automobile
negligence situation where insurance likely exists,' the Florida view should be
able to effectively guide a court in the majority of cases.
That approach eliminates the inconsistencies of categorizing the negligent
act either as one of parental discretion or control or as within or outside the
scope of the parental relationship. The Florida view also avoids subjecting
1241d. at 656.
"'See Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 83 IIl. App. 3d 234, 403 N.E.2d 1256 (1980).
11157 Ill. App. 3d 68, 372 N.E.2d 1127 (1978).
t2Id. at 70, 372 N.E.2d at 1128.
'See Appendix for additional approaches.
129414 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 1982).
"Id. at 1067. The court did qualify its abrogation by stating that the immunity would not be waived if no in-
surance existed or if the insurance policy contained a family exclusion clause. Id. at 1070.
1"Id. at 1068
"'See Comment, A Job Half-Done, supra note 29, for an explanation of this inconsistency.
"'See Comment, A Job Half-Done, supra note 29, at 650, which discusses the observation of the Florida
Supreme Court in Ard v. Ard, supra note 129, where it predicted that the most common child/parent suit
will involve automobile accidents.
COMMENTSSpring, 19851
15
Hall: Parent-Child Tort Immunity Law in Ohio
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1985
AKRON LAW REVIEW
parents to adherence to the nebulous community standard of a Gibson ap-
proach. Although it can be criticized since it limits recovery where insurance
exists only, with the possible discriminatory effect on those unable to afford
liability insurance, the Florida approach will provide redress to a large class of
injured plaintiffs who would have previously borne the consequences of
another's negligent act.
The various approaches discussed above demonstrate that states, in-
cluding Ohio, will continue to be faced with litigation as to which approach
constitutes the most equitable view. In point of fact, a further issue concerning
the status of parental immunity has arisen due to the response of the insurance
industry to the trend toward abrogation of the immunity.
OHIO ABROGATION NULLIFIED By FAMILY EXCLUSION CLAUSES?
An issue not yet raised in the Ohio Supreme Court is whether a family ex-
clusion clause134 in a liability insurance policy can operate to defeat the court's
abrogation of the parental-child tort immunity doctrine. By sustaining the
validity of a family exclusion clause, "5 the court would not only be contradict-
ing its own rationale when it abrogated the immunity but it would also be
violating an express public policy of this state as evidenced by the legislature's
adoption of a Financial Responsibility Act. 36
When the Ohio Supreme Court abrogated the immunity doctrine, it stated
that the traditional justifications supporting the doctrine were absent.' To
allow insurance companies to circumvent its rationale in Kirchner by permit-
ting family exclusion clauses, that have the effect of reinstating the immunity,
is obviously inconsistent.3 Furthermore, since virtually no intrafamily suits
are brought except where there is insurance,'39 recognizing the family exclu-
sion clause would destroy the rights of the minor child to bring suit. Such a
harsh result would be violative of the court's rationale in rejecting the immuni-
ty doctrine.
"'Such a clause provides that the liability policy does not cover injuries to a named insured or to a member of
the insured's family, if the injuries are caused by the named insured.
"'The court may likely sustain the validity of such a clause if it follows Ohio precedent. This proposition is
supported by the statement in the Signs case that if insurance companies are fearful of the danger of fraud
and collusion "they could provide in their policies that there be no coverage in reference to an action be-
tween such unemancipated child and his parent." Signs, 156 Ohio St. at 577, 103 N.E.2d at 748.
1"'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §4507.212 (Baldwin 1983).
"'See supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
"'See Comment, Family Exclusion Clauses: Whatever Happened to the Abrogation of Intrafamily Immuni-
ty, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 415 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Family Exclusion Clauses] where the
author argues that "[b]y denying indemnity for the negligence of an insured against another family member,
the insurance industry destroys what was achieved through the abrogation in intrafamily immunity." Id. at
420. The family exclusion clauses' inconsistency with either total or partial abrogation of the immunity doc-
trine is also condemned in Note, The Household Exclusion Clause - Returning to the Days of Family Im-
munity: State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. McPhee, 7 HAMILINE L. REV. 507 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Household Exclusion Clause].
"
9See Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971) (citing James, Accident
Liability Reconsidered- The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 553 (1948)).
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Of course, the court could argue that such clauses, which have the effect
of reinstating the immunity where the court has previously abrogated it, are
supportable on other grounds. For example, the court can argue freedom of
contract principles, namely, that the insurer and insured can bargain for
various kinds of liability insurance." However, since most insurance contracts
are adhesional, the inclusion of the family exclusion clause should be declared
unconscionable as a "bad faith effort by insurance companies to misrepresent
policy benefits to unwary and unsophisticated consumers."",1
Additionally, recognition by the Ohio Supreme Court of the family exclu-
sion clause violates an express public policy of the state. When it enacted the
law that requires every driver operating a motor vehicle in Ohio to maintain
proof of financial responsibility,' 42 arguably the legislature sought to provide
minimum levels of insurance for any injured motorists. 4 Allowing a family ex-
clusion clause to eradicate the minimum levels of protection that the
legislature sought to provide would contravene the dictates of Ohio's Financial
Responsibility Act.'"
Furthermore, approval of family exclusion clauses in automobile liability
insurance policies would also violate express statutory language to the con-
trary. Ohio Revised Code §4509.54 lists the permissible exclusions of
automobile liability policies and does not include family exclusion clauses
among its permissible exclusions. 45 Thus, Ohio should not recognize the exclu-
sion clause, particularly in the context of automobile insurance policies."
The issue of the family exclusion clause (i.e., as the functional equivalent
140'This argument lacks merit due to the increasing use by insurance companies of the family exclusion
clause. For example, the court in Schwalbe v. Jones. 16 Cal. 3d 514, 522 n. 9, 546 P.2d 1033, 1038 n. 9, 128
Cal. Rptr. 321, 326 n. 9 (1976) took judicial notice that such clauses appeared in virtually all auto insurance
policies issued in that state. Id. Although the holding in Schwalbe was overruled in Cooper v. Bray, 21 Cal.
3d 841, 582 P.2d 604, 148 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1978) (en banc), the judicial notice taken in Schwalbe remains
valid. See infra text accompanying note 147.
"4Comment, Family Exclusion Clauses, supra note 138 at 416.
142See supra note 136.
143Since Ohio does not keep records of debate surrounding its legislative enactments, this proposition is sub-
ject to an attack that it is mere speculation. However, one of the obvious effects of such a law should be an
increase in the percentage of motorists who carry liability insurance.
"By analogy, cases from other jurisdictions support this proposition. See Estate of McNeal v. Farmer's Ins.
Exch., 93 Nev. 348, 566 P.2d 81 (1977). (Family exclusion clause is void where it violates state law's
minimum levels of required liability insurance) and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Ins. Dept., 672 P.2d 810
(Wyo. 1983). (Clause is void to extent of minimum coverage contemplated by state law).
"'OHio REv. CODE ANN. §4509.54 provides:
A motor-vehicle liability policy need not insure any liability under any workers' compensation law, or
any liability on account of bodily injury to or death of an employee of the insured while engaged in
the employment, other than domestic, of the insured, or while engaged in the operation, maintenance,
or repair of any such motor vehicle, or any liability for damage to property owned by, rented to, in
charge of, or transported by the insured. Id.
'Since Ohio expressly disapproves of the family exclusion clause in automobile insurance policies under
§4509.54, it should also disapprove of them in homeowner's policies. See Note, The Household Exclusion
Clause, supra note 138, where the author states that approval of a family exclusion clause in a homeowner's
policy and disapproval of such clause in an auto policy is an "inherent inconsistency." Id. at 517.
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of the immunity doctrine) is raised due to the strong possibility of future litiga-
tion in this area. For example, the Allstate Insurance Company, a party in
both Karam and Sumwalt, now includes family exclusion clauses in its liability
insurance policies. 47 If they have not done so already, probably many other in-
surance companies will follow Allstate's lead to avoid liability, even though the
Ohio Supreme Court has abrogated the immunity doctrine. It will be a matter
of time until a parent or child challenges such a clause as being violative of the
public policy expressed either by the court's cases or the legislature's statutory
enactments.
The debate over the insurance industry's use of the family exclusion
clause has surfaced in other states, with conflicting results. For example, the
California courts have upheld the validity of family exclusion clauses despite
their inconsistency with court opinions totally abrogating parental immunity
in California."" In contrast, the Wyoming courts hold such clauses invalid,
with the effect of permitting suits between parents and children, even though
the courts still retain the immunity doctrine in Wyoming.1 9
The erratic results of courts dealing with the parental immunity/family
exclusion clause issue should signal the Ohio courts to prepare for such litiga-
tion. With the results of the other jurisdictions in mind, the Ohio courts can re-
main consistent with Kirchner's in toto obliteration of the immunity doctrine
by holding any family exclusion clause invalid.
CONCLUSION
With its decision in Kirchner v. Crystal, the Ohio Supreme Court has pur-
portedly laid to rest the anachronistic parent-child tort immunity doctrine. Un-
fortunately, the abrupt manner in which the court reversed its position on pa-
rental immunity has placed the status of the doctrine in doubt. Justice J.P. Cel-
ebrezze's inexplicable change from Mauk's retention of the immunity to Kirch-
ner's in toto rejection of the doctrine some five months later has unnecessarily
opened the court to the criticism that the change was political maneuvering.) 0
Despite the possible problems with the manner the court employed in
reversing its views on parental immunity, abrogation of the doctrine in Kirch-
ner clearly comports with the current legal thought in most American jurisdic-
tions. As evidenced by the experiences of other states that have at least partial-
ly abrogated the doctrine, the probability of future litigation in Ohio on the im-
"'A typical Allstate provision reads:
THIS INSURANCE DOES NOT APPLY UNDER: Coverage B, bodily injury to any insured or
member of the family of an insured residing in the same household as the insured.
'"See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Cocking, 29 Cal. 3d 383, 628 P.2d 1, 173 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1981).
"'See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Wyoming Ins. Dept., 672 P.2d 810 (Wyo. 1983).
'"See supra text preceding note Ill and see also, supra notes 2 and 6.
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munity issue is high. This high probability of future litigation is due to the
reaction of the liability insurance industry in placing family exclusion clauses
in insurance policies in an attempt to circumvent the court's abrogation of the
immunity. 5' In light of the other states' experiences, Ohio can avoid the incon-
sistency of sustaining the validity of family exclusion clauses by declaring such
clauses invalid. 52
While the Ohio Supreme Court is applauded for its rejection of parent-
child tort immunity, its change was long overdue. "Why intelligent Justices of
this court had to wait this long to discern the justice in eliminating parental
and child immunity is inexplicable.... [U]ntil our decision today some parents
and children were denied due process of law and equal justice. This was an un-
necessary judicial extravagance."'53
JEFFREY L. HALL
..See supra notes 140 and 147.
"'
2See supra text accompanying notes 142-45 and note 138.
"15 Ohio St. 3d at 331, 474 N.E.2d at 279 (C. Brown, J., concurring).
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APPENDIX
Validity of Parent-Child Immunity in the United States
I. Total Abrogation - Ten States
A. Parental Immunity Doctrine Replaced With Reasonable Parent Stan-dard
1. California: Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d
648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (en banc).
2. Minnesota: Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn.
1980).








Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 51
Hawaii 484, 462 P.2d 1007 (1970).
Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d
1013 (1974).
Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588
(1966).
Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245
N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529 (1969). How-
ever, parents have no legal duty to their
children to supervise them properly and, thus,
are not liable for injuries caused by their fail-
ure to supervise. Holodook v. Spencer, 36
N.Y.2d 35, 51, 324 N.E.2d 338, 346, 364
N.Y.S.2d 859, 872 (1974).
Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474
N.E.2d 275 (1984).
Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351
(1971). Pennsylvania clarified its total abroga-
tion by holding that "negligent supervision of
a minor is not incognizable as a cause of ac-
tion as a matter of law." Miller v. Leljedal, 71
Pa. Commw. 372, 379, 455 A.2d 256, 259
(1983).
Elam v. Elam, 275 S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109
(1980).
C. Doctrine Never Actually Adopted
1. North Dakota: Nuelle v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967).
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II. Partial Abrogation - Twenty-Five States
A. Immunity Abrogated Except Where The Exercise of Parental Author-











Sandoval v. Sandoval, 128 Ariz. 11, 623 P.2d
800 (1981) (en banc). Immunity abrogated in
automobile negligence cases and where the
negligent act involved a breach of "a duty
owed to the world at large, as opposed to duty
owed to a child within the family sphere." Id.
at 14, 623 P.2d at 803.
Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979).
Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 83
Ill. App. 3d 234, 403 N.E.2d 1256 (1980). See
also, Larson v. Buschkamp, 105 I11. App. 3d
965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (1982) and Hogan v.
Hogan, 106 I11. App. 3d 104, 435 N.E.2d 770
(1982). However, the most recent Illinois Su-
preme Court case stated that parents are im-
mune unless their conduct was willful or wan-
ton. Thomas v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 77 I11.
2d 165, 171, 395 N.E.2d 538, 540-41 (1979).
Turner v. Turner, 304 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa
1981).
Rigdon v. Rigdon, 465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky.
1970).
Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d
169 (1972).
Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335
(1974).
Felderhoff v. Felderhoff, 473 S.W.2d 928
(Tex. 1971).
Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 370 A.2d 191
(1977).
Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d
193 (1963). Goller is the leading case concern-
ing the parental authority and discretion ex-
ceptions developed by most of the above juris-
dictions.
*Delaware also falls among those jurisdictions that have abrogated the doc-
trine to the extent of liability insurance.
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B. Immunity Abrogated Where The Injury Was Caused By Negligence





















Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8 (Alaska 1967).
Ooms v. Ooms, 164 Conn. 48, 316 A.2d 783
(1972). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §52-
572c (West Supp. 1985).
Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 227 Kan. 758,
611 P.2d 135 (1980).
Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979).
See also Flagg v. Flagg, 458 A.2d 748 (Me.
1983).
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royale, 656 P.2d
820 (Mont. 1983).
Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 27, 627 P.2d
869 (1981).
Triplett v. Triplett, 34 N.C. 212, 237 S.E.2d
546 (1977). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§1-539.21 (1983) andSnow v. Nixon, 52 N.C.
App. 131, 277 S.E.2d 850 (1981).
Silva v. Silva, 446 A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982).
Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d
190 (1971).
Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 610
P.2d 891 (1980).
Lee v. Comer, 224 S.E.2d 721 (W.Va. 1976).
to Extent of Liability Insurance
Williams v. Williams, 369 A.2d 669 (Del.
1976). Williams is limited to automobile
negligence cases. Id. at 673.
Ard v. Ard, 414 So.2d 1066 (Fla. 1982).
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339
N.E.2d 907 (1975). Limited to automobile
negligence cases. Id. at 352-53, 339 N.E.2d at
916.
Unah v. Martin, 676 P.2d 1366 (Okla. 1984).
Limited to automobile negligence cases. Id. at
1370.
d Except Where Suit Seriously Disrupts Family
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Owens v. Auto Mut. Indem., 235 Ala. 9, 177
So. 133 (1937). See also American Fire &
Casualty Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins.
Co., 290 Ala. 21, 273 So.2d 186 (1973).
Thomas v. Inmon, 268 Ark. 221, 594 S.W.2d
853 (1980). Arkansas has abrogated the doc-
trine in the case of willful and wanton con-
duct. See Attwood v. Estate of Attwood, 276
Ark. 230, 633 S.W.2d 366 (1982).
Horton v. Reaves, 186 Colo. 149, 526 P.2d
304 (1974) (en banc).
Coleman v. Coleman, 157 Ga. App. 533, 278
S.E.2d 114 (1981).
Pedigo v. Rowley, 101 Idaho 201, 610 P.2d
560 (1980).
Vaughan v. Vaughan, 161 Ind. App. 497, 316
N.E.2d 455 (1974). Indiana has abrogated the
doctrine where the suit is against a non-
custodial parent where the parents' marriage
dissolved prior to the child's injury. Buffalo v.
Buffalo, 441 N.E.2d 711 (Ind. App. 1982).
Boundurant v. Boundurant, 386 So.2d 705
(La. Ct. App. 1980). Louisiana has abrogated
the doctrine where the parents are divorced.
Id. at 706.
Shell Oil Co. v. Ryckman, 43 Md. App. 1, 403
A.2d 379 (1979). Maryland has abrogated the
doctrine for malicious and wanton wrongs.
Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923
(1951).
McNeal v. Estate of McNeal, 254 So.2d 521
(Miss. 1971). See also (the landmark decision
recognizing parental immunity in the United
States) Hewlett v. George, 69 Miss. 703, 9 So.
885 (1891).
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IV. Issue Not Considered -
1. South Dakota:
Winn v. Gilroy, 61 Or. App. 243, 656 P.2d
386 (1983). Oregon has abrogated the doc-
trine where the tort is willful or malicious.
Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771
(1964).
Campbell v. Gruttemeyer, 222 Tenn. 133,
432 S.W.2d 894 (1968).
Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980).
Immunity abrogated only for intentional
torts.
Oldman v. Bartshe, 480 P.2d 99 (Wyo. 1971).
Wyoming has abrogated the doctrine where a
parent has injured his child willfully or wan-
tonly. Id. at 101.
One State
Courts in this state have not considered the is-
sue of a minor suing a parent but have held
that a parent cannot maintain a suit against
an unemancipated child for injuries sustained
in an automobile accident. See Kloppenburg
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